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Despite being a global problem, climate change has disproportionately large impacts on non-Western countries
in the form of extreme weather events, threats to food security, and displacement of communities. Climate
change mitigation is therefore an immediate priority requiring both international and local efforts. Motivating
public action is especially important because pro-climate policies require public mandate to be approved and
implemented. Behavioural scientists have identified communication strategies that can effectively motivate
public support for climate action. However, most of this research has been conducted on Western, Educated,
Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (or WEIRD) populations, making it unclear if these strategies can be
applied elsewhere. In this perspective, we discuss climate change communication strategies that have been
developed on WEIRD samples. These include using partisan messengers, conveying social norms, and citing
experts. We posit that these climate communication strategies developed in Western societies may not be
applicable in other populations. We then consider the cases of two countries–the Czech Republic and India
to discuss how context-specific insights about citizens’ priorities, concerns, and experiences with nature can
be used to communicate climate change. We build on these case studies to propose INCLUDE, a framework
that can be adopted by communicators such as policymakers, elected officials, scientists, and activists in
non-WEIRD societies to develop effective climate communication strategies informed by context-specific and
culture-specific insights.
Science ⇒ Policy
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to Climate change communication; strategies developed in western countries,
on WEIRD samples, may not be generalisable to non-Western contexts. Messages communicating the need
to take climate change mitigation action in non-Western countries must incorporate culture-specific insights
about the public’s experiences, priorities, and vocabulary relating to climate change.
Keywords Behavioural science · Climate change · Communication · Non-Western cultures ·
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Communicating Climate Change Beyond Western Societies
Climate change is a pressing global problem re-
quiring urgent policy and civic action [1]. Be-
havioural scientists have contributed significantly
to addressing this problem by investigating public
attitudes to climate change [2, 3], and develop-
ing effective communication strategies [4]. For
example, behavioural research has found that vot-
ers are more likely to support a climate-related
policy when it is proposed by a member of their
own party [5]. Similarly, individuals who have
experienced extreme weather events like floods
and storms are more likely to perceive climate
change as a threat, and therefore take action
to mitigate it [6]. Studies also show the role of
social norms in enhancing pro-climate attitudes.
For example, research conducted on Americans
found that informing participants that 97% of sci-
entists believe in human-caused climate change
increased participants’ belief in anthropogenic
climate change [7]. Similarly, norms about how
supportive their friends and family are of cli-
mate action increased individuals’ support for
pro-climate policies [8]. However, a majority of
this and other behavioural and psychological re-
search has been conducted on participants from
cultures with similar demographic features: West-
ern, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic
(or WEIRD) [9, 10]. Given the cultural and resul-
tant cognitive and affective differences in WEIRD
and non-WEIRD populations, much behavioural
research conducted on WEIRD samples may not
generalise to non-WEIRD ones [11]. Therefore,
it is unclear whether behavioural insights about
climate communication are applicable to the re-
maining 84% of the world’s population [12].
Communicating the need to mitigate climate
change is especially relevant in non-Western coun-
tries facing disproportionately large impacts of
climate change such as water shortage, displace-
ment of populations, and threats to food security
[13]. Yet, similar to Western countries, most
non-Western countries are not making adequate
mitigation efforts. For example, no non-Western
country ranks among the top-15 performers in
the Environmental Performance Index [14]. More-
over, of the top-ten emitters of carbon dioxide in
2018, 6 were non-Western nations [15]. For the
purposes of this article, we define non-Western
countries as countries in the Global South [16],
as well as post-socialist countries including the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.
This classification of post-socialist countries as
non-Western aligns with the existing social envi-
ronmental research, which argues that social, cul-
tural and political developments in post-socialist
regions resulted in qualitatively different public
perceptions and approaches to environmental is-
sues compared to the West [17–20].
Addressing climate change globally requires an
increase in public support of climate change mit-
igation efforts in the non-West. Targeted com-
munication strategies can increase public support
by convincing individuals about the importance
of taking environmental action. Yet, increasing
evidence suggests that climate change communi-
cation strategies that were successful in Western
countries might not be as effective in non-Western
cultures. For example, in contrast to some West-
ern countries like the US where climate change
is a partisan issue [3], people in the Czech Re-
public perceive environmental issues as strictly
apolitical. Consequently, Czech citizens believe
that environmental issues require technocratic
solutions [21] and are less willing to make per-
sonal sacrifices to address those issues, than are
individuals from Western cultures [22]. A qualita-
tive study testing environmental communication
strategies in India also warned practitioners from
directly taking messages used in the West, citing
that the direct translation of such messages may
not be culturally appropriate in the Indian con-
text [23]. These differences are echoed in research
from other collectivistic cultures. For example,
South Koreans were found to be more influenced
by others’ beliefs about climate change, than were
members of individualistic cultures such as the
U.K. [24]. Similarly, Chinese individuals placed
more value on future benefits from addressing
climate change in the present (e.g., improved air
quality a year from now) than did Americans
[25]. This is in line with findings showing that
perceptions, concerns and reasoning related to
the environment are not generalisable across cul-
tures [11, 26, 27]. Given the differences between
Western and non-Western societies, conducting
original research and developing novel communi-
cation strategies for non-Western countries are
crucial steps in addressing climate change on the
global scale.
In this paper, we outline how investigating and
applying culture-specific insights can inform cli-
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mate change communication strategies in two
non-Western countries: the Czech Republic and
India. We then propose a framework through
which researchers, policymakers, and practition-
ers can derive such culture-specific insights.
Case Study: Czech Republic
Communication Insight 1
Incorporate Local Values of Nature Appre-
ciation
Czech citizens have been more sceptical about
climate change, compared to citizens of other
European countries. In 2016, Czechs expressed
the least concern and personal responsibility for
reducing climate change among the surveyed Eu-
ropean nations [28]. Similarly, in 2015, approxi-
mately one in three Czechs believed that climate
change was not happening [29]. Despite a signif-
icant shift in recent years – 84% of Czechs now
consider anthropogenic climate change a major
future threat [30] – the public remains reluctant
to personally act on the issue [17]. A majority
of Czechs (61%) do not feel morally responsible
for climate change and 42% of the population
believes that their actions cannot help mitigate
climate change [31].
Despite their reluctant attitudes about climate
change, Czechs hold strong values of protecting
and appreciating nature [30, 32]. Czech culture
involves nature-related activities such as scouting
and hiking, and Czechs prioritise holiday desti-
nations with rich natural environments [21, 33–
35]. Czechs also display one of the highest levels
of consensus across Europe that environmental
protection should be prioritized over economic
development [36]. Communication efforts in the
Czech Republic may thus benefit from presenting
climate change mitigation policies as critical to
preserving the natural environment and nature-
related recreational activities.
Communication Insight 2
Use Local Environmental Changes as Ex-
amples of the Impacts of Climate Change
Individuals perceive climate change as an abstract
concept, with impacts distant in time and space
[37, 38]. Linking the changing climate to changes
in one’s immediate environment can help frame
the issue more concretely, hence increasing envi-
ronmental action.
In the Czech Republic, droughts are one of the
most prominent impacts of climate change. Three
out of four Czechs reported noticing negative im-
pacts of droughts [32]. Due to their extensive
coverage in the national media, droughts have
strengthened Czechs’ perceptions of the link be-
tween climate change and extreme weather events.
In fact, findings from a national survey indicated
that Czechs view droughts as the primary threat
associated with climate change [28]. There are,
however, a range of other impacts of climate
change that remain largely unnoticed by the pub-
lic. One such example is the Eurasian spruce bark
beetle outbreak which is intensified by climate
change, and continually degrades Czech forests.
In 2018, roughly 4% of Czech spruce tree forest
cover was lost due to bark beetles, the highest
among the last five years [39]. By illuminating
the link between climate change and other local
issues such as the bark beetle outbreak, commu-
nication campaigns can increase the perceived
relevance of addressing climate change and spark
public action.
Communication Insight 3
Employ Locally Trusted Messengers as Ad-
vocates for Climate Action
Whereas communicating the scientific consensus
on climate change as well as highlighting political
elites’ endorsement of climate policy have been
successful strategies in Western societies [7, 40],
individuals from non-Western countries such as
the Czech Republic may place their trust in dif-
ferent institutions and public figures. A 2020
National survey found that the army and police
were the most trusted, whereas political parties
and churches were the least trusted public insti-
tutions in the country [41, 42]. Consistent with
this finding, successful local environmental initia-
tives have been apolitical and unaffiliated with
political ideology, often stemming from agricul-
tural and engineering backgrounds [21]. Climate
change communication in the country may thus
be more effective if it came from apolitical and
respected figures, such as high-ranked officials
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Link Climate Change to Economic Devel-
opment
India ranks in the top-five most vulnerable coun-
tries to climate change in terms of deaths (per 100
inhabitants) and economic loss (per unit GDP)
resulting from changing climate and weather pat-
terns [43]. Yet, its policies prioritise economic
growth over climate change mitigation. For ex-
ample, the government continues to subsidise
coal usage and rely on coal-produced energy for
more than half of the country’s GDP, has reduced
the ministry of environment, forest and climate
change’s funding by half, and has relaxed reg-
ulations about the use of renewable energy to
facilitate its “make in India” movement [44]. In
international fora, the Indian government main-
tains its stance of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities (CBDR), the notion that devel-
oped nations must have a larger responsibility
to mitigate climate change because they have
contributed more to it [45].
The government’s stance is emboldened by the
fact that the Indian public also prioritises the
economy over the climate. A national survey
showed that climate change was not among Indi-
ans’ top-25 priorities, and air and water pollution
were only priorities for urban residents. On the
other hand, “better employment opportunities”
was the top national priority [46]. Moreover, re-
search shows that Indians’ key measures of na-
tional progress include poverty eradication, edu-
cation, and employment opportunities, but not
climate change mitigation [23]. Contrastingly, in
a 2020 survey, 64% of Americans said that the
environment should be a “top priority” for the
president and congress [47].
What Indian citizens often fail to notice is that
climate change hampers India’s economic develop-
ment by reducing agricultural revenue, triggering
natural disasters, and burdening the healthcare
system [48, 49]. Framing climate change miti-
gation as essential for meeting citizens’ desired
economic goals may therefore increase demand
and support for pro-climate policies in India [50].
Communication Insight 2
Understand the Public’s Proxies for Cli-
mate Change
Citizens from diverse backgrounds may not neces-
sarily understand or use the term “climate change”.
For example, whereas the most common word
that came to mind when thinking of climate
change was “melting ice” for Americans [51], it
was “don’t know” for Indians [52]. Many Indian
communities may instead use natural changes
such as increase in temperature, change in mi-
gratory birds’ patterns, reduced crop yield, and
water scarcity as indications or proxies for climate
change [53]. These proxies have helped scientists
and activists understand local concerns and con-
sequences of climate change [54, 55]. Therefore,
national efforts should focus on understanding
these local, often non-technical, conceptions of
climate change and incorporating them into mes-
sages. For instance, changing crop yield and
rainfall can be used to communicate the presence
and consequences of climate change.
Communication Insight 3
Show that Public Opinion Can Make a Dif-
ference
Citizens’ disengagement with climate action could
be because they believe that their opinions and
efforts will not make a difference at the national
level [56]. The belief that their opinion does not
matter may be prevalent because India’s current
channels of seeking public opinion on climate poli-
cies are inefficient and inaccessible. To register
their climate concerns, citizens are required to
file legal notices in the national environmental
court [44]. Given India’s diversity, research must
be conducted within local communities to gather
public opinions on climate change [23]. More-
over, evidence from the Sundarbans – a man-
grove in eastern India threatened by changing
weather patterns – highlights that understanding
the residents’ unique personal experiences with
agriculture and fishing can generate more effec-
tive environmental policies. In particular, this
study found that community members with low
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Socio-Economic Status (SES) faced most severe
environmental threats to their livelihood and de-
manded greater integration with nearby towns
to supplement their income than did members of
higher SES [55].
Therefore, the government should seek public
opinion on climate change via existing grass-
roots communication channels including local
village meetings, door-to-door field studies, and
text/WhatsApp message surveys. Besides enrich-
ing policy, this move will also convey to citizens
that their voice matters at the local and national
levels, therefore encouraging them to engage in
climate-related issues in their communities.
“INCLUDE” Framework of Cli-
mate Change Communication
in Non-Western Countries
The case studies show how communicators, in-
cluding scientists, journalists and policymakers,
can tap into culture-specific values, beliefs and
knowledge to motivate public climate action in
the Czech Republic and in India. The differences
between these two non-Western countries also
highlight that there is no one-size-fits-all solution:
climate change communication must be context
specific. Popular models of climate change com-
munication, such as the Centre for Research on
Environmental Decisions (CRED)’s principles of
climate change communication, include evidence-
based communication strategies such as commu-
nicating factual and emotional content, highlight-
ing social norms, emphasising a shared social
identity, and constructing pro-environmental de-
faults to make climate action easier [57]. However,
CRED and other such models derive their insights
from research conducted on WEIRD populations
(mostly the United States).
Below, we propose the INCLUDE framework of
gaining behavioural insights on climate change
communication in non-Western societies. Unlike
pre-existing models, INCLUDE emphasises the
need for research to develop evidence-based cli-
mate change communication strategies in diverse
societies, and equips practitioners with guidelines
on conducting and applying this research.
Inclusive Research
Firstly, communicators must commission nation-
ally representative research to investigate public
attitudes through both quantitative and qualita-
tive methods. Using a mixed-methods approach
(surveys, interviews, and observations) on a na-
tionally representative sample will ensure that
diverse educational, economic, and cultural back-
grounds can be reflected in the research [58].
Understand Public Concerns and
Vocabulary
As is evident from the case studies, citizens of
different countries have different concerns. For
example, while economic development is a ma-
jor concern in India, water shortage and loss of
the natural landscape are concerns in the Czech
Republic. Research must identify the public’s
concerns, priorities, and attitudes towards socio-
political issues, as well as the vocabulary used to
discuss climate change-related concepts.
Design Messages Based on
Context-Specific and Empirical
Insights
To design convincing messages, communicators
must combine their context-specific insights with
evidence from behavioural science research on cli-
mate change communication such as the CRED
model. For example, findings from behavioural
science research indicating that personal experi-
ence with extreme weather events can increase
support for climate action [6], and context-specific
insights about the natural calamities a local com-
munity has faced (e.g., floods in Assam, India)
can be combined to create communication mes-
sages that connect personal experience to climate
action.
Evaluate the Messages Empirically
Finally, empirical tests should be conducted to
assess the effectiveness and applicability of the
proposed climate change communication message
before disseminating it to the community. Com-
municators should evaluate the message’s effect
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on measurable outcomes such as shift in citizens’
climate-related beliefs (self-reported via inter-
views, surveys, and Likert scales) and mitigation
efforts through hypothesis testing (with the null
hypothesis that the message has no effect on re-
ceivers’ beliefs and actions).
Conclusion
We present the argument that climate communi-
cation must be informed by context-specific and
culture-specific insights in order to promote pub-
lic action on climate change. Our case studies
of the Czech Republic and India indicate that
many culture specific insights about citizens’ pri-
orities, nature-related beliefs, and understanding
of climate change can be used to design com-
munication promoting climate action. We posit
the INCLUDE framework of climate change com-
munication. INCLUDE can aid policymakers
and other communicators (e.g., governments, ac-
tivists, scientists) in gathering local insights and
incorporating them into effective climate change
communication.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by the Cambridge
University Science & Policy Exchange under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/,
which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
References
[1] M. Babiker, P. Bertoldi, M. Buckeridge,
A. Cartwright, W. Dong, J. Ford, S. Fuss,
J.-C. Hourcade, D. Ley, R. Mechler, P. New-
man, A. Revokatova, S. Schultz, L. Steg, and
T. Sugiyama, “Strengthening and implement-
ing the global response,” in Special report
on global warming of 1.5 C, 2018. [Online].
Available: https://bit.ly/ipcc_report
[2] K. S. Fielding, M. J. Hornsey, and J. K.
Swim, “Developing a social psychology of cli-
mate change,” European Journal of Social
Psychology, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 413–420, 2014.
[3] A. Leiserowitz, E. Maibach, S. Rosen-
thal, J. Kotcher, P. Bergquist, M. Ballew,
M. Goldberg, and A. Gustafson, “Climate
Change in the American Mind: November
2019,” Yale University and George Ma-
son University, 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://bit.ly/2OeJWgB
[4] M. C. Nisbet, “Communicating Climate
Change: Why Frames Matter for Public
Engagement,” Environment: Science and
Policy for Sustainable Development, vol. 51,
no. 2, pp. 12–23, 2009. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.3200/ENVT.51.2.12-23
[5] K. S. Fielding, M. J. Hornsey, H. A.
Thai, and L. L. Toh, “Using in-
group messengers and ingroup values
to promote climate change policy,” Cli-
matic Change, vol. 158, no. 2, p.
181–199, 2020. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02561-z
[6] S. Linden, “The social-psychological deter-
minants of climate change risk perceptions:
Towards a comprehensive model,” J. Envi-
ron. Psychol, vol. 41, p. 112–124.
[7] S. L. Linden, A. A. Leiserowitz, G. D. Fein-
berg, and E. W. Maibach, “The Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change as a Gateway
Belief: Experimental Evidence,” PLOS ONE,
vol. 10, no. 2, 2015. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118489
[8] M. H. Goldberg, S. van der Linden,
A. Leiserowitz, and E. Maibach, “Per-
ceived Social Consensus Can Reduce
Ideological Biases on Climate Change,”
Environment and Behavior, vol. 52, no. 5,
pp. 495–517, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916519853302
[9] M. Muthukrishna, A. V. Bell, J. Henrich,
C. M. Curtin, A. Gedranovich, J. McInerney,
and B. Thue, “Beyond Western, Educated,
Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)
Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales
of Cultural and Psychological Distance,” Psy-
chological Science, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 678–701,
2020, pMID: 32437234. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620916782
[10] J. J. Arnett, “The neglected 95%: why Amer-
ican psychology needs to become less Ameri-
can,” American Psychologist, vol. 63, no. 7,
p. 602–614, 2008. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.7.602
6 Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 2 (2021), Issue 2
Communicating Climate Change Beyond Western Societies
[11] J. Henrich, S. J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan,
“The weirdest people in the world?” Behav-
ioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 33, no. 2-3,
p. 61–83, 2010. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
[12] T. Kaneda, C. Greenbaum, and K. Kline,
“2020 World Population Data Sheet,” Popu-
lation Reference Bureau. [Online]. Available:
https://bit.ly/3tJgT51
[13] United Nations, “Unprecedented Impacts of
Climate Change Disproportionately Burden-
ing Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses,
as Second Committee Concludes General
Debate,” accessed Jul. 20, 2020. [Online].
Available: http://bit.ly/3aOMycB
[14] Z. A. Wending, J. W. Emerson, A. Sherbinin,
and D. C. Esty, 2020 Environmental Perfor-
mance Index. New Haven, CT: Yale Center
for Environmental Law & Policy. [Online].
Available: https://epi.yale.edu
[15] J. Tollefson, “The hard truths of climate
change – by the numbers,” Nature, ac-
cessed Jul. 20, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://go.nature.com/2Z0Lqx6
[16] A. G. Mahler, Global South. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://
doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780190221911-0055.
[17] M. L. Smith and P. Jehlička, “Environmental
values in central and eastern europe: Per-
spectives from east and west,” Sociologický
Časopis / Czech Sociological Review, vol. 48,
no. 3, pp. 409–419, 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23534995
[18] S. Ferenčuhová, “Not so global climate
change? Representations of post-socialist
cities in the academic writings on climate
change and urban areas,” Eurasian Geog-
raphy and Economics, vol. 61, no. 6, pp.
686–710, 2020. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1768134
[19] S. Baker and P. Jehlička, “Dilemmas
of transition: The environment, democ-
racy and economic reform in east cen-
tral europe - an introduction,” Envi-
ronmental Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, pp.
1–26, 1998. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1080/09644019808414370
[20] L. Henry and L. Sundstrom, “Climate
change policies in the post-socialist world,”
Current History, vol. 113, pp. 278—-
283, 2014. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1525/curh.2014.113.765.278
[21] P. Jehlička, P. Sarre, and J. Podoba, “The
Czech Environmental Movement’s Knowl-
edge Interests in the 1990s: Compatibility of
Western Influences with pre-1989 Perspec-
tives,” Environmental Politics, vol. 14, no. 1,
pp. 64–82, 2005. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000310187
[22] S. Marquart-Pyatt, “Environmental Con-
cerns in Cross-National Context: How Do
Mass Publics in Central and Eastern Europe
Compare with Other Regions of the World?”
Sociol. Časopis Czech Sociol. Rev, vol. 48,
no. 3, p. 441–466.
[23] G. Marshall, S. Yashwant, C. Shaw,
and J. Clarke, “Communicating climate
change in India: a Global Narratives
project,” Climate Outreach. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://bit.ly/36WfwWR
[24] K. Eom, H. S. Kim, D. K. Sherman,
and K. Ishii, “Cultural Variability in
the Link Between Environmental Concern
and Support for Environmental Action,”
Psychological Science, vol. 27, no. 10,
p. 1331–1339, 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616660078
[25] M. Gong, D. H. Krantz, and E. U.
Weber, “Why Chinese discount future fi-
nancial and environmental gains but not
losses more than Americans,” Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 49, no. 2,
pp. 103–124„ 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-014-9200-5
[26] M. Muthukrishna and J. Henrich, “A
problem in theory,” Nature Human
Behaviour, vol. 3, no. 3, Art. no.
3, 2019. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0522-1
[27] L. Zaval, “Culture and climate ac-
tion,” Nat. Clim. Change, vol. 6, pp.
1061–1062„ 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3164
[28] European Social Survey, “European Social
Survey (ESS), Round 8 - 2016,” 2017. [On-
line]. Available: https://doi.org/10.21338/
NSD-ESS8-2016
Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 2 (2021), Issue 2 7
Communicating Climate Change Beyond Western Societies
[29] J. Krajhanzl, “Česká veřejnost a změna kli-
matu 2015,” in Katedra environmentálních
studií FSS MU, Brno, Czech Republic, 2015.
[30] S.T.E.M., “Stem, trendy (listopad)
2019,” Praha, 2020. [Online]. Available:
http://bit.ly/37lsg9J
[31] R. Hanzlová, “Postoje české veřejnosti ke
změně klimatu na Zemi,” in Centrum pro
výzkum veřejného mínění, Sociologický ústav
AV ČR, v.v.i, Praha, 2019.
[32] J. Krajhanzl, T. Chabada, and R. Svo-
bodová, Vztah české veřejnosti k přírodě a
životnímu prostředí: reprezentativní studie
veřejného mínění, 2018.
[33] P. Sarre and P. Jehlička, “Environmental
Movements in Space-Time: The Czech and
Slovak Republics from Stalinism to Post-
Socialism,” Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr, vol. 32,
no. 3, p. 346–362, 2007.
[34] A. Martin, G. Watson, J. Neu-
man, I. Turčová, and L. Kalkusová,
“Czech education in nature traditions,”
Hist. Educ. Rev, vol. 49, no. 1, p.
31–43, 2020. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1108/HER-04-2019-0008
[35] European Commission, “Flash Eurobarome-
ter 432: Preferences of Europeans towards
tourism,” 2016, accessed: Jul. 30, 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://bit.ly/2Oukh3J
[36] C. Funk, A. Tyson, B. Kennedy, and
C. Johnson, “Science and Scientists Held
in High Esteem Across Global Publics,”
2020, accessed: Sep. 29,. [Online]. Available:
http://pewrsr.ch/372T5zj
[37] C. Brick and S. Linden, “Yawning at the
Apocalypse,” The Psychologist, vol. 31, pp.
30–35„ 2018.
[38] S. Linden, E. Maibach, and A. Leis-
erowitz, “Improving Public Engagement
With Climate Change: Five ‘Best Prac-
tice’ Insights From Psychological Science,”
Perspect. Psychol. Sci, vol. 10, no. 6,
p. 758–763, 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615598516
[39] “Ministry of the Environment of the Czech
Republic, “Aktualizace Komplexní studie
dopadů, zranitelnosti a zdrojů rizik souvise-
jících se změnou klimatu v ČR z roku 2015,”
2019, accessed: Oct. 30, 2020. [Online].
Available: https://bit.ly/2Z7gMlS
[40] P. J. Ehret, L. Boven, and D. K. Sher-
man, “Partisan Barriers to Bipartisanship:
Understanding Climate Policy Polariza-
tion,” Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci, vol. 9,
no. 3, p. 308–318, 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618758709
[41] E. Medzihorská, “Důvěra v evropské a mez-
inárodní instituce - duben 2019,” in Centrum
pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Sociologický
ústav AV ČR, v.v.i, Praha.
[42] R. Hanzlová, “Důvěra k vybraným institucím
veřejného života – září 2020,” in Centrum
pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Sociologický
ústav AV ČR, 2020, vol. v.v.i. [Online].
Available: https://bit.ly/3rCLyz2
[43] D. Eckstein, V. Künzel, L. Schäfer, and
M. Winges, “Global Climate Risk Index
2020,” Germanwatch, p. 44, 2020. [Online].
Available: https://www.germanwatch.org/
en/17307
[44] P. Soni, “Why India needs to see cli-
mate change as urgent political issue,”
Down to Earth, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://bit.ly/375WkpI
[45] M. Ramesh, “India to insist on ‘differen-
tiated responsibilities’ at Madrid climate
talks,” The Hindu, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://bit.ly/3jDiYeh
[46] T. Sastry, V. Rawat, N. Raj, D. K. Singh,
and K. Mishra, “All India Survey on Gov-
ernance Issues and Voting Behaviour 2018,”
Association for Democratic Reforms, 2018.
[47] “Environmental Protection Rises on the
Public’s Policy Agenda As Economic Con-
cerns Recede,” Pew Research Center -
U.S. Politics & Policy, vol. 13, 2020,
accessed Nov. 02, 2020. [Online]. Available:
http://pewrsr.ch/3d8kKmB
[48] K. Ninan and S. Bedamatta, Cli-
mate Change, Agriculture, Poverty and
Livelihoods: A Status Report. Banga-
lore: Institute for Social and Economic
Change, 2012. [Online]. Available: https:
//ideas.repec.org/p/sch/wpaper/277.html
[49] S. Hallegatte, M. Bangalore, L. Bonzanigo,
M. Fay, T. Kane, U. Narloch, J. Rozenberg,
8 Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 2 (2021), Issue 2
Communicating Climate Change Beyond Western Societies
D. Treguer, and A. Vogt-Schilb, Shock
Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate
Change on Poverty. The World Bank, 2015.
[Online]. Available: https://bit.ly/2NboqZH
[50] G. Ananthakrishnan, “Parley: Is India
doing enough to combat climate change?
,” The Hindu, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://bit.ly/3rBTIb0
[51] A. Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Per-
ception and Policy Preferences: The Role of
Affect, Imagery, and Values,” Clim. Change,
vol. 77, p. 45–72, 2006. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9
[52] J. Thaker, N. Smith, and A. Leiserowitz,
“Global Warming Risk Perceptions in In-
dia,” Risk Analysis, vol. 40, no. 12,
pp. 2481–2497, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13574
[53] A. Sabherwal, “Climate proxies can effec-
tively mobilise public action and tackle
climate change,” Down to Earth, 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://bit.ly/372Q1DE
[54] P. Chaudhary and K. Bawa, “Local percep-
tions of climate change validated by scientific
evidence in the Himalayas,” Biol. Lett, vol. 7,
no. 5, p. 767–770, 2011. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0269
[55] S. Dasgupta, B. Guha, and D. Wheeler, “Co-
Location, Socioeconomic Status and Percep-
tions of Environmental Change in the Indian
Sundarbans,” World Bank, p. 19, 2019.
[56] K. Hamann and G. Reese, “My Influ-
ence on the World (of Others): Goal
Efficacy Beliefs and Efficacy Affect Pre-
dict Private, Public, and Activist Pro-
environmental Behavior,” J. Soc. Issues,
vol. 76, no. 1, p. 35–53, 2020. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12369
[57] D. Shome, “The psychology of climate change
communication: a guide for scientists, jour-
nalists, educators, political aides, and the
interested public,” Center for Research on
Environmental Decisions, 2009.
[58] S. Almalki, “Integrating Quantitative and
Qualitative Data in Mixed Methods Re-
search – Challenges and Benefits,” J. Educ.
Learn, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 288–296, 2016.
About the Authors
Anandita Sabher-




at the Department of
Psychology. Having
lived in India, Sin-
gapore, and now the
UK, she recognises the diverse and disproportion-
ate impacts of climate change in various societies
and social groups. Therefore, she is committed
to using the tools of psychology and behavioural
science to research and shape pro-climate
attitudes around the world. Anandita is an
incoming PhD candidate in the Department
of Psychological and Behavioural Science at









is the founder of the
non-profit initiative
Green Dock, which conducts research to help
understand public attitudes toward climate
change and applies behavioural insights to build
public support for climate change mitigation in
the Czech Republic. He can be contacted at
oek22@cam.ac.uk.
Conflict of interest The Authors declare no
conflict of interest.
Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 2 (2021), Issue 2 9
